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Abstract:   We present evidence on the duration of firm-bank relationships using a unique
panel data set of connections between Oslo Stock Exchange-listed firms and their banks for
the period 1979-1994. We focus on the determinants of the duration of a relationship and
the causes for ending an existing bank relationship. We find that duration itself does not
greatly influence the likelihood of ending a relationship: short-lived relationships are as
likely to end as long-lived relationships. We also find firms that maintain simultaneous
multiple-bank relationships are more likely to end a bank relationship than a single-bank
firm and that small, highly-leveraged "growth" firms are more likely to end a bank
relationship than large, low-leveraged "value" firms.
This paper was presented at the Wharton Financial Institutions Center’s conference on The
Performance of Financial Institutions, May 8-10, 1997.
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JEL Codes:  G21, C41I.  Introduction
We use a panel data set containing annual information on the bank connections for
virtually all Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE)-listed companies for the sixteen-year period
1979-1994 to study the duration of bank relationships.  The driving motivation behind
our study is to shed further light on the notion that (a) banks play a vital role in
resolving information asymmetries that hinder some firms from obtaining financing and
(b) this role arises through the relationship the bank develops with a firm.
In particular, we focus jointly on the length of bank relationships and the
decision a firm takes to end a bank relationship and possibly begin another, an event
we term a switch.  Recent theoretical papers in banking suggest that the duration of a
relationship itself may influence the decision to end the relationship.  For instance, the
repeated provision of bank services through time may reveal valuable private
information about the customer to the bank.  In so doing, an established relationship
increases the array of contracting possibilities, but also increases the possibility that the
bank can use the private information it obtains to “lock in” the customer to the bank.
1
Our data set permits us to directly estimate the dependence of the decision to switch
banks on the length of the existing relationship and thus yields a novel approach to
examining implications from recent theoretical banking papers.
Moreover, the value to a firm of an existing bank relationship may also vary as
a function of the degree of asymmetric information between the firm and the public,
the availability of alternative monitoring mechanisms and the need and availability of
alternative financing sources.
2  To study these possibilities, we widen our analysis to
model the duration of bank relationships as a function of a set of exogenous variables
meant to proxy for the services offered by competing banks, the level of uncertainty
about firm value, the financing needs of the firm and the existence of alternative
monitoring sources.
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) also study the
importance of the duration of bank relationships.  Using the 1988-89 National Survey
                                               
1 See Greenbaum, Kanatas and Venezia (1989), Sharpe (1991) and Boot and Thakor (1994).
2 Rajan (1992).2
of Small Business Finances, a large cross-section of data collected by the U.S. Small
Business Administration (SBA), Berger and Udell (1995) find that the interest rate
charged and collateral pledged on lines of credit is decreasing in the length of a firm’s
relationship with its bank.  Using the same SBA survey, Petersen and Rajan (1994)
find no relationship between the average loan interest rate and the length of a firm-
bank relationship, but do find that credit is more readily available to firms with longer
bank relationships.
3
Besides having a focus different from the earlier studies, our paper utilizes a
new and interesting data set that complements the detailed survey data used in the
Berger and Udell (1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1994) papers.  For example, we
derive our information on bank relationships from a time-series of annual data.  This
enables us to observe the beginning, end and evolution of many of the existing bank
relationships through time, as well as switches by firms from one bank to another.  As
one “snapshot” in time, the SBA survey data does not account for the dynamic
characteristic of the bank relationship.  Further, as opposed to a sample of small,
mostly family-owned firms as in the SBA survey, the firms in our data set are publicly
traded and include both large and small firms with varying levels of ownership
concentration.  Finally, because it has inherited characteristics of both a European-
styled, “bank-denominated” economy and a regulatory framework similar to the United
States, the Norwegian banking environment provides a rich experimental setting.  Like
many European countries, virtually all debt financing to the corporate sector in
Norway comes in the form of “inside” debt from financial institutions.  In contrast to
other European countries, banks are prohibited from owning large equity positions in
the companies they do business with.
4  Thus, although our sample firms are publicly
traded, they exist in an environment where the primary debt financing source is
“inside” bank debt.
                                               
3  A related set of papers examine the wealth effects of bank announcements on a firm-customer’s
shareholders.  James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel
(1995) investigate announcements of standby letters of credit, while Shockley and Thakor (1993)
focus on announcements of loan commitments.  Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993) study the
influence of Continental Illinois’ bank failure on its firm customers.
4  Loans from financial institutions in 1994 accounted for 91% of all outstanding debt in the non-
financial corporate sector in Norway (Statistical Yearbook of Norway, 1996), while banks owned
only 1% of the equity in the non-financial sector (Nilsen, 1995).  Norwegian law prohibits banks3
When estimating the duration of a firm-bank relationship, we are also careful to
recognize that our sample is censored; we are not able to observe the complete history
of every relationship.  Many of the bank relationships of listed firms begin before 1979
or continue after 1994, censoring our maximum observable relationship duration to
sixteen years.  Firms also list and delist during the sample period, widening the
censoring problem.  Not controlling for censoring in the data can severely bias
inferences about the length of the relationship.  For example, we find that although the
average observed firm-bank relationship is seven years, the expected duration of a
relationship, after controlling for the presence of censored observations, is at least
fifteen years and may be as long as forty years.
Consistent estimation of the duration and likelihood of switching requires an
estimator that is robust to the censored sampling distribution.  We utilize non-, semi-,
and fully-parametric estimators of hazard functions, which describe the likelihood of
ending a given bank relationship, conditional on the length of the existing relationship.
We also analyze the sensitivity of our results to assumptions about the underlying
distribution of durations.  To the extent that these estimators have seen little use in the
financial literature, our paper introduces a relatively novel methodology and provides
evidence on the importance of the use of censored-robust estimators.
When the hazard function is initially estimated using censored-robust, non-
parametric techniques, we are unable to detect a dependency between the duration of a
bank relationship and the likelihood that the relationship will end.  In other words, we
find that short-lived bank relationships are as likely to be terminated as long-lived
relationships.  This observed lack of duration dependence is inconsistent with the idea
that firms become “locked in” to bank relationships as the relationship lengthens.
Parametric estimation of the hazard function yields mixed results on duration
dependence.  A Weibull specification is unable to reject the null hypothesis of no
duration dependence in favor of monotonically increasing or decreasing dependence.
However, estimation using a distribution that allows for non-monotonic duration
dependence provides some evidence that firms are increasingly more likely to end a
                                                                                                                                      
from investing more than 4% of their assets in real estate and/or the equity of non-financial
companies (Forretningsbankloven, 1961, 24 May, Nr. 2, § 24).4
bank relationship at short durations and increasingly less likely to end a bank
relationship at longer durations.
The parametric techniques also allow us to jointly estimate the influence of firm
characteristics on the duration of bank relationships.  We find that a firm is more likely
to end a relationship, or equivalently, the expected length of a bank relationship is
shorter, when firms simultaneously maintain a relationship with more than one bank.
This finding is consistent with the argument that competing banks lessen the ability for
one bank to maintain monopoly power over a firm.
We also find the likelihood of ending a bank relationship is increasing in the
growth potential - as proxied by market-to-book-ratios- of the firm and the proportion
of firm asset’s financed with debt and decreasing in the inflation-adjusted size of the
firm.  We observe no statistically significant relationship between the level of
ownership concentration in the firm and the decision to switch.  Taken together, our
latter results suggest that it is the firms most in need of bank services and financing -
small, high-leverage, high-growth - that maintain the shortest bank relationships and
switch most often.  To the extent that this reasoning runs counter to the argument for
why bank relationships are valuable, our results present a challenge to the theoretical
banking literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides an overview
of the theoretical literature relevant to our investigation.  Section III describes the data
used in our analysis.  Section IV introduces non-parametric techniques for analyzing
duration data and presents preliminary results from the non-parametric estimation of
hazard functions.  Section V continues the empirical analysis by describing the use of
the proportional hazard model as a method for studying the influence of exogenous
variables on the hazard rate.  Section VI concludes.
II.  Theoretical Literature
A.  Information-based Theories
A distinguishing feature of a bank may be its ability to reduce costly information
asymmetries between those seeking financing and those willing to contribute capital.5
Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Fama
(1985), and Boyd and Prescott (1986) argue that a bank can monitor and credibly
communicate inside information more efficiently than its individual depositors or
borrowers.  Moreover, a bank can help to reduce the likelihood that a firm will choose
poor projects by threatening not to renew future debt contracts (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1983).  A firm that establishes a relationship with a bank can thus reduce the
uncertainty about future investment projects and obtain debt financing that would
otherwise be unavailable or prohibitively expensive.
5
B.  Bank Relationships
It is through the progression of a relationship that a bank learns more about a firm’s
ability to meet future obligations, both through past payment histories and other
services offered by the bank (e.g. deposits, clearing and payment services, lines of
credit, etc.).  Because of its ability to observe a stream of proprietary information, the
bank has the potential to extract monopoly rents from its customer.
6  At any point in
time, the bank also has the flexibility to influence a firm’s investment choice and to
deny the firm continued financing in the future.  Greenbaum, Kanatas and Venezia
(1989), Sharpe (1990) and Boot and Thakor (1994) examine the association between
the temporal nature of a firm-bank relationship and the dynamic nature of loan pricing,
the availability of credit and the influence of competition.
7
In Greenbaum, Kanatas and Venezia (1989) one firm can choose in each period
to continue its existing lending relationship or pay a fixed cost to search for a
competing bank.  In equilibrium, the value of the profit function is increasing in the
uncertainty about the firm’s future ability to pay.  A continuing relationship implies a
                                               
5  For recent reviews of the information-motivated literature on banking, see Bhattacharya and Thakor
(1993) and Thakor (1995).
6 The monopoly power is similar to markets where consumers face “switching costs”.  See Klemperer
(1987) and Nilssen (1992, 1994) for a discussion of switching costs in a more general setting.
7 Petersen and Rajan (1995, p. 5) define the bank-firm relationship to be the “close and continued
interaction” between a bank and firm that “may provide a lender with sufficient information about,
and voice in, the firm’s affairs.”  The importance of a firm-bank relationship predates the
information-based literature, see for example Roosa (1951), Hodgman (1963), Kane and Malkiel
(1965), Wood (1975) and Blackwell and Santomero (1982).6
reduction in uncertainty about the payment ability of the firm, making the firm less
valuable to the bank and more likely to switch banks.
Sharpe (1990) studies an economy where banks compete for firms of varying
unobservable quality requiring financing of two-period projects.  Within this
environment, a bank has an incentive to lure firms in the first period with below cost
loan rates.  A privately successful firm with a noisy, but low public signal of success is
“captured” by the bank and must pay a high loan rate because the cost of switching
banks is too high.  The strength of the monopoly power is mitigated by a more
accurate public signal of the firm’s ability to pay or through the loss of reputation with
new customers.
Boot and Thakor (1994) consider an infinite-period contracting framework in
which banks require pledged collateral in addition to per-period interest payments.
Banks choose the interest rate-collateral combination that dynamically induces the
borrower to expend maximal effort towards completing a project, while attempting not
to lose the borrower to another bank.  Banks offer high interest rate-high collateral
contracts in the early part of a relationship to induce optimal effort.  Once a firm
establishes a successful project, the bank reduces both the interest charges and
required collateral on the project.
C.  Bank vs. Capital Market Debt
Rajan (1992) studies an economy where a firm may choose to borrow from a bank
(“inside debt”) or from a outside source such as the bond market (“arm’s-length
debt”).  The advantage to bank debt arises from the bank’s ability to monitor the
progress of a firm’s project, its discretion in continuing the lending relationship and its
ability to influence the effort of the borrower.  An arm’s-length contract, on the other
hand, allows for no intermediate discretion in reallocating resources or changing the
contract specifications.  Rajan (1992) argues that this rigidity can have a beneficial
effect on the borrower’s incentive to expend effort on the project.
Rajan (1992) obtains several interesting results from his model.  First, a firm
should forego arm’s-length debt in favor of a long term bank contract when the bank
exerts strong bargaining power over the firm.  A bank could have strong bargaining7
power when it has strong influence over suppliers, sits on the board of the firm or
when the national economy is denominated by several (possibly government
controlled) banks.  Second, high quality firms will be more likely to forego a bank
relationship in favor of the use of arm’s-length debt.
8  Third, the ability for a bank to
maintain a relationship through its reputation (Sharpe, 1990) may be eroded since high
quality firms are more likely to borrow using arm’s-length debt.  Fourth, public signals
of a firm’s ability to pay can increase the likelihood that a firm remains captured by a
bank.  Finally, multiple bank relationships may reduce the chance that a firm may be
informationally captured, but also may lead to excessive monitoring by the banks.
D.  Summary of Empirical implications
To summarize, the theoretical literature provides a stimulus for the study of firm-bank
relationships through time and the likelihood that a firm may switch banks.
Greenbaum, Kanatas and Venezia (1989) predict that the likelihood of observing a
bank switch is increasing in the duration of the firm-bank relationship, while the
models of Sharpe (1990) and Boot and Thakor (1994) imply that the incentive for the
firm to switch relationships is decreasing in the duration of the relationship.  Sharpe
(1990) suggests that the likelihood a firm switches banks increases as public signals of
the firms ability to pay increases.  Competition, in the form of multiple bank
relationships (Sharpe, 1990 and Rajan, 1992) or arm’s-length debt (Rajan, 1992) can,
by making the costs of switching lower, increase the likelihood of observing a switch.
Finally, implicit in the moral hazard models of Boot and Thakor (1994) and Rajan
(1992) is the idea that a bank’s ability to induce value-maximizing effort may be
unnecessary if the firm has internal monitoring mechanisms to effectively steer
manager’ s efforts.
                                               
8  A similar prediction is made by Diamond (1991).8
III.  Data
A.  Characteristics of Bank Relationships
1.  Data Collection and Definitions
We obtain annual data on bank relationships of Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE)-listed
firms for the years 1979 to 1994 from Kierulf’s Handbook, an annual handbook
published by Oslo Børs Informasjon AS, a data-publishing subsidiary of the OSE.  The
handbook contains financial and accounting information on all listed firms, as well as
other firm-specific information.  In particular, as part of the listing requirement, each
firms must report on an annual basis its “primary” bank connections, up to a maximum
of four.  We identify a firm as switching banks when it drops one of its banks from the
survey or replaces one of its banks with a new bank.  We define the duration of a
relationship to be the number of years we observe a firm maintaining a bank
connection.
2.  Overview of sample
Table 1 presents an annual overview of the number of firms in our sample along with
the number of firms listing, delisting and the number of firms switching.  In a given
year, our sample on average contains roughly 100 OSE firms, representing 97% of the
population of exchange-listed firms.  We observe a total of 93 firms switching over
the sample period or an average of six per year.  The number of switches roughly
doubles in the years 1986-1988, a period in which substantial deregulation occurred in
both Norwegian financial markets and the Norwegian banking sector.
9  Concurrent
with the increase in the number of bank switches during the crisis period was an
increase in the number of firms delisting.
10  The number of firms going public increases
                                               
9  Beginning in 1984, interest rate ceilings were removed, an accommodative monetary policy was
followed, and government-mandated lending controls were lifted.  In 1985 and 1986 annual loans
by banks increased 37.5% and 23.4%, respectively.  The latter part of the 1986-1988 period also
marked the beginning of the Norwegian bank crisis.  For example, by 1987 commercial loan losses
as a percent of commercial bank loans had quadrupled from their 1984 level (Kaen and Michalsen,
1995).
10  Quite a few of the recorded delistings during this period were publicly traded banks (Kaen and
Michalsen, 1995).9
during the 1983-84 period and later in the early 1990’s, roughly matching periods in
which the level of the OSE market was high.
Table 2 summarizes some of the characteristics of the bank relationships.  The
top of Table 2 and Figure 1 provide information on the distribution of the sample firms
by the number of bank relationships maintained at a given point in time.  A firm is
defined as having a multiple bank relationship if the firm maintains more than one
simultaneous bank relationship during the sample period.  Three quarters of the sample
firms maintain only one bank relationship over our sample period, with the proportion
increasing in the 1990’s.  Another 17% of the banks maintain two relationships and
seven percent have three banks.  By the end of the sample period, very few firms have
more than three bank relationships.
11
In our analysis to follow, we define a sample observation as one firm-bank
relationship.  The number of firm-bank observations equals the total number of firms in
the sample times the number of bank relationships maintained by each firm over the
sample period.  Our data set contains 401 firm-bank observations.
The middle section of Table 2 categorizes the proportion of 401 firm-bank
observations by their observed duration.  That is, this section provides a distribution of
the length of  bank relationships for firms listed on the OSE between 1980 and 1994.
The pattern that emerges is interesting.  If we only consider the most obvious, end-of-
sample censoring, it appears that only a small proportion of relationships (8%) last
beyond fifteen years.  Furthermore, the median observed relationship lasts six years, a
third of the observed relationships do not last past two years and fully 85% of the firms
appear to have ended a bank relationship by the tenth year.  A first-pass look at the
duration data thus seems to suggest that bank relationships are short-lived and that
censoring affects only a small proportion of the observations.
The bottom of Table 2 gives a breakdown of the type of banks represented in
the sample.
12  The sample firms maintain relationships with 51 different banks.
                                               
11  These proportions are roughly consistent with the SBA Survey sample used by Petersen and Rajan
(1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) where the median number of bank relationships is one, the
proportion of firms with  more than one bank relationship is 18% and the maximum number of
banks used by one firm is six (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).
12  Panel A of Appendix 1 provides a list of the names of the banks.  Panel B maps the mergers
that occur between the sample banks within the sample period.  We assume that customers of10
Fourteen of the banks are international banks, 22 are Norwegian commercial banks,
while the remaining 15 are Norwegian savings banks.
The pie-charts in Figure 2 provide some insight into the concentration of the
relationships within the banking industry, by graphing the proportions of relationships
by bank.  The charts reveal that, despite the relatively large number of banks
represented in the sample, the relationships are concentrated.  Most importantly,
approximately 75% of the firms maintain a relationship with at least one of Norway’s
two largest banks, Den norske Bank and Kreditkassen.
13
B.  Censoring
The clearest circumstance of censoring is created by the beginning and ending dates of
our sample.  We cannot observe the entire length of relationships that begin before
1979 (a form of left censoring), nor can we observe the outcome of relationships that
continue as of 1994 (a form of right censoring).  However, the listing and delisting of
firms also represent a form of random censoring, since we are not able to observe a
firm’s bank relationship when it is not listed on the OSE.  A left censored observation
is created when a firm lists on the OSE, since the company will typically maintain a
bank relationship before it goes public.  Right censoring occurs when a firm delists, if
the delisting is due to a switch to another exchange or if the firm is taken private again.
On the other hand, a delisting due to a merger signals the end to a bank relationship (if
the merged firm does not use the original bank), as does a delisting due to liquidation.
C.  Firm-level Data
Motivated by the theoretical literature on bank relationships, we incorporate firm-
specific data that may influence the duration of, and likelihood of ending, a bank
relationship.  All financial statement and stock price data come from databases
                                                                                                                                      
merged banks continue their relationship with the combined entity after the merger so that no break
in a relationship occurs.  In results not reported here, we find that observed bank mergers do not
influence the likelihood that a firm will end a bank relationship.
13  In the earlier part of the sample period, the concentration is divided across three banks:  Bergens
Bank, (BB), Den norske Credit and Kreditkassen.  In 1990, Bergens Bank and Den norske Credit
merged to form Den norske Bank.  By 1994, the two remaining banks held 38% of the total
commercial and savings banks assets in Norway  (Source: 1995 Annual Reports and Statistical
Yearbook of Norway, 1996).11
maintained by Oslo Børs Informasjon (OBI).  Information on equity offerings (both
public and private) are obtained from the datasets used by Bøhren, Eckbo and
Michalsen (1996) and Bøhren, Eckbo, Michalsen and Smith (1996), while ownership
structure information is collected from company annual reports and Kierulf’s
Handbook.
The five firm-specific variables we use later in our analysis our discussed in the
following subsections.  We match each set of firm-specific variables to a firm-bank
observation using the value of firm-specific variable in the year prior to end of the
relationship or end the year prior to censoring.  Due to data lost in matching the two
data sets, we are left with 263 matched firm-bank observations.  Table 3 contains
summary statistics and pairwise correlation across the 263 observations for the five
firm-specific variables.
1.  Single and multiple bank relationships
Firms with more than one bank relationship may find the cost of ending one bank
relationship to be lower.  First, the ability for any one bank to “lock in” a customer will
be hindered if other banks also maintain valuable private information on the firm.
Second, competition between the banks for loan and clearing services may induce the
firm to shift all services to one bank and end services with another.  The dummy
variable MREL takes the value of 1 when a firm maintains a multiple-bank relationship
at some point during the sample period and takes the value 0 otherwise.
2.  Ownership Concentration
We may expect that a firm with high ownership concentration will be monitored and
disciplined better than a firm with disperse ownership, thus reducing the need for
monitoring services from a bank.  A highly concentrated firm may also have stronger
bargaining power against a bank in negotiating contracts. As a proxy for the
concentration of ownership and possible control, we define the variable CONC to be
the proportion of a firm’s equity owned by the ten largest shareholders.
3.  Size12
We use the size of the firm as a proxy for the degree of uncertainty about the value of
the firm.  We posit that larger firms are more likely to be followed by analysts and
appear in newspaper articles in Norway and abroad more often.  Furthermore, twenty-
two of the largest OSE firms are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
London Stock Exchange (LSE) and/or NASDAQ trading systems.  Listing on a
foreign exchange implies greater dispersion of company results and possibly stricter
reporting requirements then the OSE.  We define the variable SIZE to be the log of
end-of-year market value of equity, deflated by the Norwegian consumer price index
(CPI).
4.  Market-to-book ratios
As a measure of Tobin’s Q, market-to-book ratios can proxy for future growth
opportunities available to the firm: a high market-to-book indicates that a firm has
strong growth opportunities.  If a high growth (“growth”) firm is more likely to require
financing of its projects than a low growth (“value”) firm, then a growth firm will find
it more costly to end a relationship with the bank as its financing source.  In addition,
because much of the value of a growth firm is tied up in unrealized investment
opportunities, growth firms may face more adverse selection problems and therefore
be more reliant on bank financing vis-à-vis the use of arm’s length debt.  The market-
to-book ratio, labeled Q, is measured as the ratio of the end-of-year market value of
equity plus book value of assets divided by the book value of assets.
5.  Proportion of Debt
The last firm-specific variable incorporated in our analysis proxies for the proportion
of the firm’s assets financed with debt.  Given the heavy reliance in Norway on bank
debt, a heavily leveraged firm is more dependent on bank financing then a mostly
equity-financed firm, possibly making it costlier for the firm to switch banks.  We
define DEBT to be the ratio of the book value of debt to the sum of the market value
of equity plus the book value of debt.13
6.  Summary Statistics
As is evident from Table 3, roughly 60% of the 263 firm-bank observations come from
firms with multiple relationships.
14  The ten largest shareholders in the average sample
firm owns 68% of the equity in the firm.  The average firm has a real market value of
equity of  $18 million (measured in 1994 dollars), finances 54% of its assets with debt
and has a market-to-book value of 1.4.  Given the method for constructing the
variables, it is not surprising that SIZE, Q and DEBT are highly linearly correlated.  To
what extent this correlation influences the regression estimates remains an empirical
issue.
IV.  Analysis of Duration Data
A.  Introduction
Duration studies focus on the analysis and modeling of data which involve the passage
of time before a particular event occurs.  For instance, the study of duration data has
been applied in the labor economics literature to the length of strikes, the duration of
unemployment, and employment and the time before a pay increase.
15  In our paper,
we are interested in studying the length of a bank relationship, or the passage of time
before a bank relationship ends.  The econometrics of duration analysis has developed
primarily to estimate the distribution underlying the duration data, to study the
dependence of duration on explanatory variables and to obtain estimators that account
for censored observations.
To better understand the analysis of duration data, define T to be the duration
of time that passes before the occurrence of a certain random event.  The passage of
time is often referred to as a spell, while the occurrence itself is often called a switch.
A simple way to describe the behavior of a spell is through its survivor function,
                                               
14 The high representation of multiple-bank relationships in the set of 263 observations derives
primarily from two sources:  (1) each firm-bank relationship is counted as one observation, thus one
multi-bank firm can enter as several observations and (2) multiple-bank firms are more likely to
switch banks in our sample, generating a greater number of firm-bank relationships.
15  For a good overview of the econometrics of duration estimation, see Heckman and Singer
(1984) or Kiefer (1988).  For more recent applications, see e.g., Sueyoshi (1992), Gritz (1993),
Jaggia and Trivedi (1994) and McCall (1994).14
St T t () P r ( ) =³ , which yields the probability that the spell duration T lasts at least to
time t (i.e., the survivor function equals one minus the cumulative distribution function
of T).  An alternative way of describing the behavior of a spell is with a hazard
function.  The hazard function describes the likelihood that a switch will occur,
conditional on the spell surviving through time t and is defined by
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where ft ( ) is the density function associated with the distribution of spells.  Neither
the survivor nor the hazard function provide any additional information that could not
be derived directly from ft ( ), they are simply economically interesting ways of
examining the distributions of spell duration.
The hazard function provides a convenient method for summarizing the
relationship between spell length and the likelihood of switching.  Whenl() t is
increasing in t, the hazard function is said to exhibit  positive duration dependence,
since the probability of ending the spell is increasing in the spell length.  Similarly,
negative duration dependence occurs whenl() t is decreasing in t.  It follows that the




=0.  Under constant
duration dependence, no relationship exists between spell length and the likelihood of
switching.
B.  Non-parametric Estimation of Hazard and Survivor Functions
In this section, we introduce a methodology for summarizing and graphically viewing
the sample distribution of bank relationship duration.  The methodology employed is
intuitive and robust to censored observations.  Much of the development is taken from
Kiefer (1988).
Let hij be the number of bank relationships with observed duration i and
maximum duration j, where ij K ,, Î 0,   K  corresponds to the maximum fixed cutoff
(fifteen years in our data set) and ij £ .  An observed duration of zero (i = 0) indicates
that a firm listed a bank in one year, while both i and j are recorded as zero when a15
firm is listed for only one year.  When ij = , the spell is right censored; one cannot
distinguish whether the spell ended that year or continued in the unobserved future (hii
is the number of censored spells).
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³ å.  A natural, non-parametric
estimator forl() k, the likelihood that a firm switches banks in the kth year given that
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which is the number of switches in year k divided by the number of relationships that
have survived to length k .  Note that the estimator $ () lk is robust to right censoring
since the denominator in (1) normalizes the number of switches at length k by the
number of uncensored spells still existing at time k.
We define the estimator of the survivor function to be
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which is the Kaplan - Meier (1958) or “product-limit” estimator for the survivor
function.  An additional benefit of the survivor function is the ability to construct
approximate standard errors around the estimates $() Sk.  The approximate variance of
the survivor estimates is:
16













                                               
16 The variance measure is especially inaccurate for values of the survivor function close to 0 and 1.16
C.  Estimates of the Survivor Function
1.  Estimates using total sample
Table 4 and Figure 3 jointly provide a first look at the distribution of the duration of
bank relationships through the non-parametric estimation of the survivor function in
equation (2).
Both Table 4 and Figure 3 indicate that adjusting for censored observations in
the data drastically changes the estimated shape of the survivor function.  For instance,
the censored-robust estimated median bank relationship is fifteen years, more than
double the length implied by directly observing the data over the fifteen year period.
Furthermore, when no adjustment is made for censoring, the survivor function
decreases at a quick rate.  The estimated likelihood of surviving beyond five years is
54% and the estimated chance of surviving past fifteen years is 11%.  In contrast, the
robust estimator for the survivor function implies that 85% of the relationships will last
beyond five years and that 63% of the relationships continue after fifteen years.
Table 4 and Figure 3 also provides some insight into the importance of duration
dependence in the non-parametrically estimated hazard function.  The heavy-dashed
line plots the implied censored-robust estimate for a survivor function calculated under
the restriction that the likelihood of ending a bank relationship is independent of the
duration of the relationship.  The two light-dashed lines plot approximate 95%
confidence intervals around the restricted estimate.
17  The difference between the
restricted and unrestricted estimates is small and lies everywhere within the 95%
confidence bands, suggesting that the likelihood of ending a bank relationship is not
influenced by the duration of the relationship.
2.  Pairwise comparisons of survivor functions
To separately examine their influence of on the conditional likelihood of switching
banks, Figure 4 plots pairwise cohort comparisons of survivor functions for each of
our five independent variables.  In Figure 4a, we plot the cohort of single-bank
                                               
17 See Appendix 2 for details of the derivation of the point estimates and standard errors of the
survivor function under the restriction of constant duration dependence.17
relationships against the plot of multiple-bank relationships.  To construct each of the
cohorts in Figures 4b-e, we arrange the data from highest to lowest and split the
sample roughly in half to form a “high” and “low” cohort.  For each of the figures, we
also plot 95% confidence bands around the “low” estimates to gauge the statistical
differences in the two categories.  Several interesting patterns emerge from the plots.
First, the plots in Figure 4a suggest that firms with multiple bank relationships
are more likely to end a given bank relationship than firms with single bank
relationships.  This result holds uniformly across all intervals of time, with the
difference in the rate of ending a relationship increasing toward duration of ten years.
For example, the likelihood of a multiple-bank relationship continuing after fifteen
years is 55%, compared with 80% for single-bank relationships.
Second,  small market value firms are more likely to end a bank relationship
than large firms, with the difference in the switching probabilities being most
pronounced for intermediate duration (4 to 9 years).  In fact, Figure 4b suggests that
both size cohorts exhibit non-monotonic duration dependence.  For larger firms, the
likelihood of ending a bank relationship decreases for intermediate duration, relative to
both short (< less than 4 years) and long duration (> 9 years).  For smaller firms, the
probability of ending a bank relationship increases over the intermediate duration.
Measured at the longer duration, no statistically significant difference exists in the
survival rate of large versus small firms.
Third, no difference is apparent in the survival rates of the high and low
cohorts measured for ownership concentration and market-to-book ratios.  Plots of the
cohorts lie very near each other, with the large cohort plot lying well within the
confidence bands of the plot of the low cohort.
Fourth, Figure 4e shows high debt firms to be more likely to end a bank
relationship than a low debt firm for duration out to 12 years, where upon the two
cohorts become statistically indistinguishable.
Conclusions regarding the influence of the independent variables in Figure 4
may be misleading since they do not control for common variation among the
independent variables.  In the next section, we turn to estimating the hazard function18
within a multiple regression framework.  This framework enables us to quantify
estimates of duration dependence and allows us to jointly estimate the influence of the
independent variables on the conditional likelihood of ending a bank relationship.
V.  The Proportional Hazard Model
A.  Estimation of the Proportional Hazard Model
1.  Introduction
In this section, we introduce semi-parametric and parametric techniques for studying
the influence of explanatory variables on the duration of the banking relationship within
the context of a proportional hazard model.  The proportional hazard model assumes
that the hazard rate function can be written
lb l f b (, , ) () ( , ) tX t X = 0 ,( 4 )
where X is a set of explanatory variables,b is a vector of unknown parameters
associated with the explanatory variables,l0() t is a baseline hazard function andf() ·is
a non-negative function.
Estimation using the proportional hazard model typically requires specification
of functional forms ofl0() t andf() ·.  For example, we could begin by choosing a
function that describes the shape of the baseline hazardl0( ) t .  Define the integrated
baseline hazard to beL00
0
() ( ) Ts d s
T
= ò l  and letfb b ( , ) exp( ' ) XX = .  Kiefer (1988)
shows that, in the absence of censored observations, the proportional hazard model
can be written as a log-linear regression:
-= + ln ( ) ' L0 tX be ,( 5 )
wheree  follows an extreme value distribution (Johnson and Kotz, 1970).  An
appealing feature of equation (5) is that the coefficientsb have the usual least squares
interpretation of reflecting the partial influence of each of the variables in X on the
conditional likelihood of ending a spell.19
2.  Specification of the baseline hazard
The shape of the distribution of spell lengths arises from the specification of the
baseline hazardl0() t.  Two commonly-used specifications are the Weibull and the
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The Weibull distribution allows for duration dependence.  Whena>1 , distribution
exhibits positive duration dependence, whilea<1 implies negative duration
dependence.  The exponential is nested in the Weibull as the casea=1 and represents
the testable restriction that the likelihood of switching is independent of the duration of
the spell.
Substitution of the expression for the integrated hazard function (6) into
equation (5) indicates that estimating  a Weibull hazard model is analogous to a linear
regression of the log of duration, scaled bya, on the set of variables in X plus an
intercept, with the coefficient on the intercept representing an estimate ofl.
Depending on whether the value is greater than or less than one, the scaling factora
either “speeds up” or “slows down” log duration time.  In the exponential case,
equation (5) reduces directly to a linear regression of log duration on X.
The Weibull model restricts duration dependence to be monotonic over spell
lengths.  Figures 3 and 4 suggest the likelihood of ending a bank relationship may
increase and then decrease over the observed duration.  The log-logistic distribution,
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Whena>1 in the log-logistic specification, the likelihood of ending a spell first
increases, then decreases with duration.  When0 1 <£ a  the hazard function decreases
monotonically with duration.  A drawback to the log-logistic distribution is that
constant duration dependence is not included as a special case.
We use all three parametric specifications (exponential, Weibull, log-logistic) of
the baseline hazard to examine the influence of duration and firm characteristics on the
likelihood of ending a bank relationship.  We also consider one model that does not
require specification of a specific baseline hazard.
The Cox (1972) partial likelihood model can be used to estimate the
parameters inb without specifyingl0() t.  Let tt t n 12 <<< ...  represent an ordering of
the duration from lowest to highest.  The conditional likelihood that spell j ends after























under the proportional hazard specification (4).  Intuitively, the partial likelihood
function estimates the contribution of the jth observation to the likelihood that the spell
ends at length j.
Since the partial likelihood model assumes no specific form for the baseline
hazard, it is sometimes referred to as a “semi-parametric” model and benefits from not
being susceptible to biases induced by specifying an incorrect hazard function.
3.  Incorporating censored data
Accounting for the presence of (right) censored observations can be accomplished
using techniques standard in the literature on limited dependent variable analysis.
18
Let ftX tX S t ( , ), ) ( , , ) ( ,, ), { , }, ql q q qb a ==  represent the density function defined over
duration and note that l n (, , ) (, , ) StX tX qq =-L .  Estimation of the proportional hazard
model in the presence on censored data can be accomplished by maximizing the log-
likelihood function L() q:
                                               
18 See for example, Maddala (1988).21
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where dk takes on the value of zero if the kth observation is censored and one if the
duration is fully observed.
The interpretation of equation (9) is intuitively straightforward.  When the kth
observation is uncensored, it is used in the estimation of the density component of (9),
ftXt (, () , ) q .  When the kth observation is censored, we utilize the information that the
this observation has survived to time t to estimate the survivor functionStXt (, () , ) q .  
In the next section, we report the results from using the parametric and semi-
parametric specifications, adjusted for censoring, to estimate the influence of duration
and our firm characteristics on the likelihood of ending a bank relationship.
B.  Estimation Using the Proportional Hazard Model
1.  Results with parameterized baseline hazard
We first examine the results of multiple regression estimates of the conditional
likelihood of ending a bank relationship using alternative specifications for the baseline
hazard.  For each specification, the MLE system defined by equations (5) and the
censored-robust (9) is estimated using LIMDEP.  LIMDEP defines the likelihood
function in terms of the transformed variable, wt X ii i =- - ln ( ' ) ab , where
heuristicallylb = exp( ' ) X  is substituted into equations (6) and (7) in order to estimate
the hazard function.  Table 5 reports the slope estimates $ b and baseline hazard
parameters $ land $ a  for the exponential, Weibull and log-logistic distributions using all
five explanatory variables.
The $ exp($') lb =X is the estimate of the hazard function at the mean values of X.
The conditional likelihood of ending a bank relationship in a given year, evaluated at22
the mean value of the explanatory variables, ranges between 2.6% (exponential) and
4.7% (log-logistic).  The median length of a relationship is estimated to be between
26.7 years (exponential) and 21.4 years (log-logistic).
Given the estimate of its standard error (0.178), we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the Weibull estimate, $ . a=1249, is equal to one.  Moreover, a likelihood
ratio test statistic using the difference between the log-likelihood values of the Weibull
and exponential cannot reject the exponential distribution as a null model.  This
suggests that when we restrict the baseline hazard to exhibit monotonic duration
dependence, we cannot reject the hypothesis of constant duration dependence.
Under the log-logistic specification, however, the estimate of  $ . a =1451 is
statistically greater than one (t-value = 2.29), implying that the likelihood of ending a
bank relationship first increases in the duration of the bank relationship and then
decreases in the duration.
Independent of the baseline hazard specification, an interesting and consistent
pattern emerges in the estimates ofb.  If we use a size of 5% as a measure of statistical
significance, then firms are more likely to end a bank relationship when they maintain
more than one bank relationship, are relatively small and when their market-to-book
values are high.  Firms with relatively high debt levels also appear to be more likely to
switch banks, although the statistical significance of the relationship is weaker
(significant at the 10% level).  The concentration of ownership appears to exert no
influence on the likelihood of switching banks.
Noting thatln ' tX =-b , we can also interpret the influence of the explanatory
variables in terms of their influence on the expected duration of the relationship.  For
example, the estimate of the intercept (-3.682) in the exponential model implies that
the expected length of a bank relationship ise
36 8 2 3973
. . =  years, when all values of X
are zero.  The estimate $ . b MREL =1026 then implies that multiple-bank relationships are
expected to last onlye
(. . ) .
3 682 1 026 14 24
- = years.  Similarly,  $ . b Q = 0837 from the
exponential implies that a 1% increase in the market-to-book ratio of a firm reduces
the firm’s expected duration of a bank relationship by three years.  Likewise, the23
expected duration of a relationship increases in the inflation-adjusted size of the firm
and decreases in the proportion of debt held by the firm.
2.  Robustness checks using the partial likelihood model.
In Table 6, we use the semi-parametric, Cox (1972) partial likelihood model to check
the robustness of the distributional assumptions made above.  We also explore the
sensitivity of our results to the adjustment for censoring and to various combinations
of the explanatory variables.
The first line (Model 1) in Table 6 contains the full-scale, censored robust
estimates of the influence of the explanatory variables on the proportional hazard
function.  With the exception of the DEBT variable, the magnitude and significance of
estimates are similar to the estimates in Table 5, suggesting that the results are not
dependent on the specification of the baseline hazard.  Multiple-bank relationships and
high Tobin’s Q tend to reduce the duration of a bank relationship, while large firms
tend to maintain longer bank relationships.  Both the sign and magnitude of the DEBT
variable indicates that the proportion of debt held by a firm does not influence the
duration of the bank relationship in the partial likelihood model.
Model 2 is estimated assuming that no censoring occurs, or that all
relationships end with the last observed year of the firm-bank relationship.  When the
model does not account for censoring, inflation-adjusted size remains as a statistically
and economically important explanatory variable.  Otherwise, the slope estimates are
very sensitive to the adjustment.  For example, the number of bank relationships is no
longer important in estimating the hazard function, nor is the Tobin’s Q variable.
Thus, as in the non-parametric estimation, not accounting for censoring in the data
biases the conclusions of the multiple regression model.
Models 3-6 examine the relative influence of combinations of the explanatory
variables, by excluding some of the variables from (censored-robust) estimation.
Interestingly, the influence of the multiple bank dummy is diminished when it is the
only variable in the regression (Model 3):   the point estimate drops from 0.759 to
0.487 and is no longer significant at the 5% level.  The value of the log-likelihood
statistic (27.22) strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the excluded variables are24
unimportant in estimation.  The estimates in Model 4 suggest that ownership
concentration adds no statistical explanatory power to the model.  The value of the
likelihood ratio test statistic comparing models 3 and 4 is 2.54, which is less than the
5% (one degree of freedom) critical value of 3.84.  Adding the inflation-adjusted size
variable to the multiple-bank relationship variable (Model 5) adds a much greater
degree of explanatory power.  The increase in the value of the likelihood ratio statistic
comparing Model 5 to Model 3 is 20.2, which is far out in the right tail of chi-squared
distribution.  A likelihood ratio test comparing Models 5 and 1 indicates that the joint
contribution of the ownership concentration, Tobin’s Q and proportion-of-debt
variables are marginally significant:  the value of the statistic is 7.42 with an implied p-
value of 0.06.
3.  Discussion
Overall, we find that the likelihood of ending a bank relationship is not strongly related
to its duration.  For instance, we cannot reject constant duration dependence using
either non-parametric methods or parametric specifications in which the null of
constant duration dependence can be tested.  This result does not support the intuition
suggested by asymmetric information models in which a bank customer becomes
“locked-in” to the relationship.  Nor does the result necessarily support the idea that
firms will be more likely to leave the bank as the relationship lengthens.
The log-logistic specification provides a potential mitigating explanation for the
results on duration dependence.  A log-logistic distribution allows for duration
dependence to be non-monotonic over different spell lengths, a feature not allowed by
the Weibull specification.  Estimates based on the log-logistic distribution are able to
reject the null hypothesis of decreasing duration dependence in favor of a distribution
that first decreases in duration and then increases.  This relationship suggests the
possibility that firms find it beneficial to search for the “right” bank in the early years of
a relationship and then become locked in later in the relationship.
19
                                               
19 On the other hand, this “hump” could be an artifact of the increased number of bank switches
around the financial crisis period of 1988-1991 (Kaen and Michalsen, 1995).  However,
preliminary regressions suggest the non-monotonicity estimate is robust to inclusion of dummy
variables around the financial crisis period.25
The estimated relationship between the likelihood of ending a bank relationship
(or alternatively the duration of the relationship) and the explanatory variables is more
stable:  we find the likelihood of ending a bank relationship to be increasing (duration
of relationship to be decreasing) in a firm’s market-to-book ratio, when the firm
maintains more than one bank relationship and to a lesser degree, in the proportion of
the firm’s assets financed by debt.  We also find a strong relationship between the
firm’s real size, as measured by the inflation-adjusted log market value of equity, and
the length of a relationship:  larger firm’s are less likely to switch banks than smaller
firms.  Moreover, we find no statistical relationship between the duration of the bank
relationship and the level of ownership concentration in the firm.
The observation that multiple-bank firms are more likely to end a bank
relationship is consistent with the information-based arguments that multiple bank
relationships will decrease the value of private information to any one bank, reducing
the ability for any one bank to lock in a customer.  The results are also consistent with
the notion that multiple-bank customers find it less costly to credibly communicate
their value to the public, decreasing the value of holding any one bank relationship.
Our results, however, present a puzzle if we accept that the other explanatory
variables served their intended use as proxies that indicate:   (1) the level of  firm
uncertainty, (2) the overall need for financing and (3) the need for bank monitoring.
For instance, we would expect that larger firms would be more likely to have a
higher switch rate (and shorter relationship duration), if there is less uncertainty about
firm value in large firms and if large firms have a greater array of financing alternatives.
Larger firms are less likely to be locked-in by a bank when exposure by analysts,
regulators and journalists reveals more information about the firm.  For the same
reason, a large firm should have greater access to competitive alternatives to bank
financing.
High growth firms, other things equal, should be more dependent on bank
financing to fund investment opportunities.  Moreover, growth firms may be riskier
and more susceptible to information problems, since a larger portion of firm value is
related to projects not yet realized (Martin, 1996).  Thus it is also puzzling that we find
that high growth firms are more likely to switch banks if higher risk, growth firms are26
more likely to be locked in to a bank relationship by information asymmetries with the
public. A similar argument holds for firms with high debt financing.  A high-debt
financed firm within the bank-denominated Norwegian economy should find it costlier
to leave a particular bank relationship, if banks maintain monopoly power.
Contrary to the implications from the information-based literature, our results
suggest that firms that are in most need of bank financing maintain relatively shorter
relationships and are more likely to end a bank relationship than firms where bank
financing may be of a secondary need.
VI.  Conclusion
Many of the most interesting theories arising from the theoretical banking literature
focus on the potential for a bank to mitigate information asymmetries that hinder firms
from obtaining valuable financing.  An appealing aspect of this literature comes from
the idea that both banks and firms gain from their ongoing relationship.  Firms which
can only credibly communicate valuations at a large cost, gain from a bank’s ability to
dynamically improve a financing contract once the bank has privately observed the
payment ability of the firm.  The bank stands to gain from the relationship if it can
“lock in” the firm as a customer and extract monopoly rents because of the information
it learns about the firm.
The extent to which these theories have been explored empirically is limited.
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) study the importance of the
duration of bank relationships and find somewhat conflicting results.  Berger and Udell
(1995) find that the interest rate charged and collateral pledged on lines of credit is
decreasing in the length of a firm’s relationship with its bank and Petersen and Rajan
(1994) find that credit is more readily available to firms with longer bank relationships.
Both papers argue that the favorable contracts terms to older customers arise through
the shared benefits of relationship.  On the other hand, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find
no relationship between the average loan interest rate and the length of a firm-bank
relationship.
Using a new time-series data set based on the bank connections of OSE-listed
firms over the period 1979-1994, we explore the importance of bank relationships by27
studying the determinants of their duration and termination.  We first explore the
dependency between the length of a bank relationship and the decision to terminate the
relationship and find no strong link between the two.  This result is important by itself
since the relationship-theories typically suggest a link between the duration of the
relationship and the contracting possibilities available to the firm.  We also explore firm
characteristics that may influence the likelihood of ending a bank relationship.  We find
that the probability of ending a relationship increases when firms maintain more than
one bank relationship and as a firm’s Tobin Q and debt financing increases.  Firms are
less likely to end a bank relationship as they become larger.
Our results appear to run counter to the theories that suggest that banks have
an ability to lock in customers which have more difficulty in communicating private
valuations, already rely on bank financing or which are more likely to require financing
in the future.  On the contrary, we find that small, highly-leveraged growth firms are
more likely to end a bank relationship than large, low debt  “value” firms. Moreover,
the concentration of ownership in a firm - a proxy for both alternative monitoring
abilities and bargaining power - does not appear to influence the decision to end a bank
relationship.  These results may suggest that the selection of bank services is
competitive enough to induce those most needing bank financing to “shop around”.
Drawing too many conclusions from our study would be unwarranted, since
our data set suffers from a number of shortcomings.  First, we are unable to observe
the reason for the termination of a firm-bank relationship.  In this paper, we have
implicitly assumed that any termination is initiated by the firm.  It is likely that a bank
could also terminate a relationship.  A possible avenue for future research would
investigate the sensitivity of observed bank switches to changes in the banking
environment or to bank characteristics rather than firm characteristics.  We are also
unable to observe information specific to the contract between each firm and their
bank:  we can only observe that a relationship exists.  Therefore, our study lacks an
analysis of the influence of the cross-sectional variation that is sure to exist in the debt
contracts held by the firm.28
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1
Barclays Bank Plc., London Midland Bank Mees Pierson N.V.
Bergens Skillingsbank Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., NY or London
Bergen Bank A/S National Westminster Bank
Brumunddal Ringsaker Sparebanken Norges Hypotekinstitutt
Buskerudbanken A/S Oslo-Banken
Bøndernes Bank A/S Ringsaker Sparebanken
Chase Manhattan Bank, London or NY Rogalandsbanken A/S
Chemical Bank, London, Oslo or NY Royal Bank of Canada, London
Citibank Sparebanken ABC
Credit Lyonnaise Sparebanken Hedemark
Den norske Bank A/S Sparebanken Midt-Norge
Den norske Creditbank A/S Sparebanken Nord-Norge
Fellesbanken A/S Sparebanken NOR
Finansbanken A/S Sparebanken Oslo Akershus
First National Bank of Commerce, NY Sparebanken Sør
Forretningsbanken A/S Sparebanken Vest
Fokus Bank A/S Sparebanken Vestfold
Gjensidige Bank Sparebanken Østlandet
Hambros Bank Ltd., London SR-Bank
Handelsbanken Sunnmørsbanken A/S
Kreditkassen Sørlandsbanken A/S
Landsbanken A/S Sør-Varanger Sparebanken
Lazard Brothers & Co. Ltd., London Telemarksbanken A/S
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co., NY Texas Commerce Bancshares, Houston
Manufacturers Hanover Corporation, NY Trondhjems og Strindens Sparebanken
Meldal Sparebanken Vestfoldbanken
Merging banks into Year
Den norske Creditbank A/S Den norske Bank A/S 1990
Bergen Bank A/S Den norske Bank A/S 1990
Buskerudbanken Fokus Bank 1987
Bøndernes Bank Fokus Bank 1987
Forretningsbanken Fokus Bank 1987
Vestlandsbanken Fokus Bank 1987
Rogalandsbanken Fokus Bank 1991
Sørlandsbanken Kreditkassen 1990
Sunmørsbanken Kreditkassen 1990
Sparebanken ABC Sparebanken NOR 1990
Sparebanken Vestfold Sparebanken NOR 1990
Sparebanken Østlandet Sparebanken NOR 1990
Texas Commerce Bancshares Chemical NY Corporation 1987
Chemical NY Corporation Chemical Banking Corporation 1991
Manufacturers Hanover Corporation Chemical Banking Corporation 1991
                                                       
1 International banks are listed as one bank whether or not they have a branch or subsidiary in Norway.Appendix 2.  Constant Duration Dependence
For each estimator of the integrated hazard function L() k and for each duration
L, 2££ LK , there exists an integrated hazard function  ¢ L () k with constant duration














The approximate variance of this survivor function  ¢ Sl ( ) with constant duration
dependence is













for i = 0





and for i > 0






Hence this specification of the variance takes into consideration the number of
observations and the degree of censoring underlying the original survivor function, Sl ().
To test the null of constant duration dependence against the alternative of
negative duration dependence in period l at 5% level of significance, check
S l Sl Sl () () . ( v a r ( () )
/ < ¢ - ¢ 19 6
12.TABLE 1.  NUMBER OF SAMPLE FIRMS AND NUMBER OF FIRMS SWITCHING BANKS
Year Number of Firms
in the Sample
Lists Delists Number of Firms Switching
Banks
1979 100
1980 95 5 10 5
1981 97 4 2 2
1982 102 6 1 6
1983 121 21 2 5
1984 136 21 6 6
1985 129 6 13 3
1986 124 7 12 12
1987 113 5 16 9
1988 105 3 11 12
1989 96 8 17 5
1990 93 6 9 7
1991 105 15 3 6
1992 101 10 14 6
1993 110 14 5 4
1994 122 16 4 5
mean 1979-1994 103 9 8 6
Notes.  The third column lists the number of firms in the sample listed for the first time on the OSE.
The fourth column lists the number of firms in the sample listed for the last time on the OSE.  Notice
that firms can switch more than one bank, hence the total number of relationships ending in each year
is at least as high as the number in the fifth column in the table.TABLE 2.  SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS





Number of relationships for each firm
Mean 1.37
Median 1
Total Number of Firm Observations 401
Proportion of Observations Censored 0.77


















Duration of Observed Relationships, in Years
Mean 7.2
Median 6
Number of Banks in the Sample, by Type
Domestic - Commercial 22
Domestic - Savings 15
International 14
Total 51
Banks involved in mergers 11TABLE 3.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS
Variable Mean St.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum
MREL 0.593 0.492 -0.4 1.1 0.00 1.00
CONC 0.681 0.176 -0.8 3.9 0.00 1.00
SIZE 7.469 1.629 -0.1 2.7 3.44 12.39
Q 1.337 0.479 2.2 11.8 0.48 4.58
DEBT 0.536 0.227 -0.4 2.9 0.00 0.96
Variable MREL CONC SIZE Q DEBT
MREL 1.000
CONC -0.120 1.000
SIZE 0.155 -0.083 1.000
Q -0.074 0.042 0.313 1.000
DEBT 0.168 -0.083 -0.148 -0.567 1.000
Notes.  Number of observations: 263.  MREL takes the value of 1 when a firm maintains a multiple-bank
relationship at some point during the sample period and takes the value 0 otherwise.  CONC is the
proportion of a firm’s equity owned by the ten largest shareholders.  SIZE is the log of end-of-year
market value of equity, deflated by the Norwegian CPI.  Q is the ratio of the end-of-year market value
of equity plus book value of assets divided by the book value of assets.  DEBT is the ratio of the book
value of debt to the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt.TABLE 4.  NON-PARAMETRIC ESTIMATES OF THE SURVIVOR FUNCTION OF BANK













0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1 0.871 0.960 0.948 0.969 0.990
2 0.764 0.947 0.909 0.939 0.969
3 0.662 0.893 0.873 0.910 0.947
4 0.605 0.877 0.839 0.882 0.925
5 0.544 0.854 0.806 0.855 0.903
6 0.434 0.828 0.775 0.828 0.881
7 0.388 0.813 0.744 0.802 0.861
8 0.327 0.771 0.715 0.778 0.840
9 0.247 0.721 0.686 0.754 0.821
10 0.202 0.709 0.657 0.730 0.803
11 0.175 0.681 0.629 0.708 0.786
12 0.141 0.649 0.602 0.686 0.770
13 0.126 0.649 0.574 0.665 0.755
14 0.114 0.629 0.548 0.644 0.740
15 0.107 0.629 0.523 0.624 0.726
Median duration 6 15 15




















































akes the value of 1 when a firm maintains a multiple-bank relationship at some point du
of a firm’s equity owned by the ten largest shareholders.  SIZE is the log of end-of-year 
-of-year market value of equity plus book value of assets divided by the book value of a
of equity plus the book value of debt.  All estimates are adjusted for censoring.  Coeffic
etween parentheses.  The last column lists the log of the likelihood L(q) and the log like
o test statistic, -2log(L(qweibull)/L(qexpo)), which is asymptotically c
2(1), H0: a=1 cannot
gnificant at 10%.  ªª  Significantly different from one at a 5% level.TABLE 6. PARTIAL LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF CONDITIONAL HAZARD FUNCTION
















































Notes.  Number of observations: 263.  MREL takes the value of 1 when a firm maintains a multiple-bank
relationship at some point during the sample period and takes the value 0 otherwise.  CONC is the
proportion of a firm’s equity owned by the ten largest shareholders.  SIZE is the log of end-of-year
market value of equity, deflated by the Norwegian CPI.  Q is the ratio of the end-of-year market value
of equity plus book value of assets divided by the book value of assets.  DEBT is the ratio of the book
value of debt to the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt.  The estimates in
model 2 are not adjusted for censoring.  The estimates in model 1 and 3 to 6 are adjusted for
censoring.  Coefficients are listed on the first row in each cell and standard errors are reported below
between parentheses.  The last column lists the log of the likelihood L(q) and the log likelihood ratio
test statistic between parentheses.  The latter statistic is -2log(L(q1)/L(qi)), asymptotically c
2(n) , with
i=3,..., 6, and n=4 if i=3 and n=3 otherwise.  *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant
at 10%.FIGURE 1.  SINGLE AND MULTIPLE-BANK RELATIONSHIPS



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes.  Number of observations: 263.  The bold solid line represents the survivor function of the “low”
group of firms, the other solid line represents the survivor function of the “high” group.  The dashed
lines represent a band of 2 standard deviations around the survivor function of the “low” group.  The
stratification sheme for MREL has 107 observations in the “low” group.  These firms have only one
relationship.  The cut-off levels in the other stratification shemes are chosen in order to approximately
divide the sample in two equally sized groups: there are 132 observations with CONC lower than 0.7,
126 observations with SIZE lower than 7.5, 156 observations with DEBT lower than 0.6, and 135
observations with Q lower than 1.25. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.